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Line 1737 - Commentary Note (CN) More Information

Notes for lines 1018-2022 ed. Eric Rasmussen
For explanation of sigla, such as jen, see the editions bib.
1737 Thus conscience dooes make cowards <of vs all>, 3.1.82
1765- Davies
Davies
1737 Davies (1765-): “Conscience in this place means reflection exciting fear and doubt—”
1826 sing1
sing1
1737 Singer (ed.1826): “‘I’ll not meddle with it, ----it makes a man a coward.’---King Richard III [1.4.135 (968)]. And again:-- ‘O coward conscience, how dost thou afflict me.’ Ib [5.3.179 (3641)].”
1843 col1
col1
1737 Collier (ed. 1843): “The words ‘of us all,’ which most likelly had dropped out at the end of the line in the quarto, 1604, (they are in the quarto, 1603,) are from the folio, 1623.”
1856b sing2
sing2=sing1
1872 cln1
cln1
1737 Clark & Wright (ed. 1872): "Compare Richard III, i. 4. 137 sqq."
1885 macd
macd
1737 MacDonald (ed. 1885): “It is not the fear of evil that makes us cowards, but the fear of deserved evil. The Poet may intend that conscience alone is the cause of fear in man. ‘Coward’ does not here involve contempt: it should be spoken with a grim smile. But Hamlet would hardly call turning from suicide cowardice in any sense.24”
1934a cam3
1737 Wilson (ed. 1934): “conscience = reflection, conciousness. Bridges has restored this meaning in The Testament of Beauty. Cf. Bradley.”
1982 ard2
ard2
1737-8 Thus . . . thus] Jenkins (ed. 1982): “Some difficulty has also arisen at l. 84 [1738] from the transition to a new topic which the repeated ’thus’ may disguise. The first thus (83) [1737] introduces, I take it, the conclusion which follows on all the preceding discussion : and with this the reflections prompted by the initial ’question’ come to an end. But at the same time they lead, with the second thus (84), to a further reflection on a kindred matter in which the same trait of human nature may be seen. In fact the frustration of the impulse to seek death now offers itself as a particular example of a general tendency in men for any act of initiative to be frustrated by considerations which it raises in the mind.
"Of the two senses the first is exhibited in R3 I. iv. 134, ’it makes a man a coward’, V. iii. 179, ’coward conscience’, and V. iii. 309; the second in Tim. II. ii. 176-7, ’Canst thou the conscience lack To think I shall lack friends?’ The choice between the two has been much debated. (1) is emphatically repudiated by Bradley (p. 98 n.) against OED. But it is upheld by reference to Elizabethan usage by, among others, Joseph (Conscience and the King, pp. 108-10), Prosser (pp. 167-70 (169-72)), and especially C. Belsey in ’The Case of Hamlet’s Conscience’ (SP, LXXVI, 127-48). This is also the sense in which the word is used by Belleforest in conjunction with the cowardice (poltronnerie) that hinders gallant enterprises (see Intro., p. 95) - in view of which it is less necessary, though still instructive, to note that Cardan’s Comfort (1573, N6) attributes man’s unhappiness to ’a cowardly and corrupt conscience’. The Timon passage relied on for sense (2) reveals itself as exceptional. The R3 parallels, with their thrice-repeated association with cowardice, are strongly in favour of (1), and it is clearly implied in all seven other uses of the word in Hamlet. The antithesis between Hamlet, who here sees conscience as a deterrent, and Laertes, who consigns ’conscience . . . to the profoundest pit’ (IV. v. 132 [2879]) is striking. Moreover, this sense follows naturally from the ’dread’ of the after-life, which an uneasy conscience will increase. C.S. Lewis believes that conscience here means ’nothing more or less than "fear of hell" ’ (Studies in Words, p. 207). What alone is against this sense is that it does not so naturally lead on : the faltering of resolution as a result of ’thought’ (l. 85) cannot easily be attributed to the recognition or fear of wrongdoing but rather to what Hamlet later calls ’thinking too precisely on th’event’ (IV.iv.41). Excess of ‘thought’ comes from awareness of (and attention to) various considerstions, but if that is what conscience now suggests, there is a shift of meaning. In fact there is no necessity to see lines 84-8 as concerned with ‘conscience’ at all. Resolution weakens in the course of thinking just as courage to death weakens through the operation of conscience. The commentators maintain (1) or (2) according as they associate conscience more with what precedes or with what follows. For the Bradleians, who tend to equate ‘conscience’ with ‘thought,’ it is frequently ‘reflection’. D. G. James (The Dream of Learning, p. 42) argues that the word here carries both meanings — ‘both a command to do what is right and anxious reflections as to what is, in fact, the right thing to do’. I believe firmly in (1), which must be the meaning in l. 83, after which the inhibiting of action by the conscience which fears the after-life becomes but one instance examplifying (‘and thus’) the general process described in ll. 83-7. See above, ll. 56-88 [1710] LN."
1737