Notes for lines 2023-2950 ed. Frank N. Clary
| 2455+1 {Els could you not haue motion, but sure that sence} 2455+1 | 3.4.72 |
|---|
1733 theo1
theo1
2455+1-2455+5 sence . . . difference] Theobald (ed. 1733): See 2455.
[
The following note is from BWK: “I put a note about motion/notion in warb 1747 doc. This is also in the 50 that he sent to Theobald to be included in the volumes of poems, as having been forgotten by theo1 in the first edition. And this is in Nichols, Illus, 2:644.
“2455+1{Els could you not haue motion, but sure that sence:} does WW change motion to notion with a note? Theobald, in a letter to WW, Nichols, 2:501, suggested a similar emendation from motion to notion in
Ant. “I see it in my motion, have it not in my tongue” [2.3.14 (979)] which he sees as // to
Hamlet’s “in my mind’s eye,
Horatio,” and in Ham: “Give it an understanding, but no tongue.”
theo1 does not emend
Ham 2455+1 to notion. Yes, WARB does emend it to notion, w/o a note. This is another of the subtle ways that WW learned from Theobald w/o acknowledging the fact. WW does have a long note, with a general reference to Sh’s use of the “peripatetic principle of
Nil fit intellectu,
quod non fuerit in sensu....It is true the
Romans used
motio for
notio, because in thinking the Platonists supposed the mind moved and agitated, Hence, [Grk],
cogitare, & [Grk],
cogitatio, i.e.
coagitarem coagitatio. But in
English this will not do.” So of course WW adds a great deal to Theobald’s letter. Still, the origin is Theobald.
“There is also a letter from Theobald, 19 Feb. 1729-30, Nichols,
Illus, 2:501, where he wants to change a motion to notion, but not in
Hamlet. This is from
Ant. “ ‘I see in in my motion [he wants
notion], have it not in my
tongue. I conjecture, Notion.’ ” The structure of the page in Nichols suggests that Nichols missed something, because there’s a too sudden shift from the motion/notion issue to
Ham mind’s eye, with no good transition. If I have time I could look at W.b. 74-75 again to check this. But here is the note from
theo, justifying emendation to
notion, that
john1 uses in his
Ant. 7.148n6:
“I see it in my Motion, have it not in my Tongue [john1 lemma] “What motion? I can trace no sense in this word here, unless the author were alluding to that agitation of the divinity, which diviners pretend to when the fit of foretelling is upon them; but then, I think verily, he would have wrote, emotion. I am persuaded, Sh. meant that the Soothsayer should say, he saw a reason in his thought or opinion, though he gave that thought or opinion no utterance. THEOBALD.
“ I see it in my motion,—[i.e. the divinitory agitation. warb.”]”
]
1747 warb
warb
2455+1 motion] Warburton (ed. 1747): “But from what philosophy our editors learnt this, I cannot tell. Since motion depends so little upon sense, that the greatest part of motion in the universe, is amongst bodies devoid of sense. We should read, ‘Else could you not have NOTION, i.e. intellect, reason, &c.’ This alludes to the famous peripatetic principle of Nil sit in INTELLECTU, quod non fuerit in SENSU. The principles of this philosophy, we have given several instances. The principle in particular has been since taken for the foundation of one of the noblest works that these latter ages have produced. It is true the Romans used motion for notio, because in thinking the Platonists supposed the mind moved and agitated. Hence GREEK HERE, cogitare, & GREEK HERE, cogitatio, i.e. coagitare, coagitatio. But in English this will not do.”
1755 Johnson Dict.
Johnson Dict.
2455+1 motion ] Johnson (1755): 1. “ the act of changing place.”
2. “ manner of moving the body; port; gait
”
3. “ change of posture; action.”
4. “ tendency of the mind; thought.”
5. “ proposal made.”
1765- mDavies
mDavies: see Davies 1784
2455+1 motion] [Davies] (ms. notes in Johnson, ed. 1765, opp. 8: 241): “Motion depends upon the will of the person who moves; and this is sufficient to justifie the reading in all the copies Warburton The allusion to ye peripatetick Philosophy is a whim of his own of Warburton & not of Sh.
“The lowest degree of animal sense is motion & therefore properly here applied to one whom he is accusing of having neither sight nor judgment.”
BWK adds: “For once, the annotator does not quote the line, which is ‘Sense, sure, you have, Else could you not have notion;’ refutes warb whose note appears in and is accepted by john, who emends to notion.”
1765 john1/john2
john1 ≈ warb (compressed and modified as marked) + magenta underlined
2455+1 motion] Warburton (apud ed. 1765): “But from what philosophy our editors learnt this, I cannot tell. Since motion depends so little upon sense, that the greatest part of motion in the universe, is amongst bodies devoid of sense. We should read, ‘Else could you not have NOTION, i.e. intellect, reason, &c.’ This alludes to the famous peripatetic principle of Nil sit in INTELLECTU, quod non fuerit in SENSU. And how fond our author was of applying, and alluding to, the principles of this philosophy, we have given several instances. The principle in particular has been since taken for the foundation of one of the noblest works that these latter ages have produced. It is true the Romans used motion for notio, because in thinking the Platonists supposed the mind moved and agitated. Hence GREEK HERE, cogitare, & GREEK HERE, cogitatio, i.e. coagitare, coagitatio. But in English this will not do.” Warburton.
john1 ≈ warb
2455+1 motion] Johnson (ed. 1765, Appendix, Ll3): “For notion, which the note of Dr. Warburthon had persuaded me to admit into the text, I would now replace the old reading motion; for though the emendation be elegant, it is not necessary.”
In the text, “notion” is still in place.
1773 jen
jen: contra warb
2455+1 motion]
Jennens )ed. 1773): “
W[arburton] says that
, Motion depends so little upon sense,
that the greatest part of motion
in the universe, is amongst bodies devoid of sense: therefore
motion is improper, and we should read
notion, i.e.
intellect, reason, &c. But why may not
motion here signify the power of moving one’s self as one pleases, or
self-motion, and then it is necessary it should be accompanied by both
sense and
will.”
1773 v1773
v1773 = john1 minus Appendix addendum
1774 capn
capn
2455+1 motion] Capell (1774, 1:1: glossary, notion): “the understanding or Intellect.”
1778 v1778
v1778 = v1773 + Oth., Cym. //s; Braithwaite analogie
2455+1 motion] Malone (apud ed. 1778): “Motion is frequently used, by Sh. and others, for impulse of nature, —libinous inclination. Taking it in this sense, the passage is sufficiently intelligible without any alteration. So, in Oth. [1.3.30-31 (682-83)]: ‘—we have reason to cool our raging motions, our carnal stings, our unbitted lusts.’ Again, in Cym.[2.5.20-21 (1358-59)]; ‘—for there’s no motion That tends to vice in man , but I affirm It is the woman’s part.’ Again, in Braithwaite’s Survey of Histories, 1614: ‘These continent relations will reduce thy straggling motions to a more settled and retired harbour.’ Malone.”
1783 Ritson
Ritson: contra v1778 (mal)
2455+1 motion]
Ritson (1783, p. 206): “This is certainly, the true reading.
Hamlet means that the queen must have some kind of
sense, otherwise she could not walk about, use her eyes, hands, &c. as she was every day seen to do. Mr. Malone’s note (in which he explains
motion by
libidinous inclination), instead of throwing light upon the passage, does essential injury to it.”
1784 Davies
Davies: see mDavies 1765-
2455+1 motion]
Davies (1784, pp. 104-5): <p.104> “Motion depends on the will of the person who moves. This is sufficient to justi- </p.104><p.105> fy the old reading; the lowest degree of animal sense is motion, and therefore properly applied to one who is accused of having neither sight nor judgement.” </p.105>
1793 v1793
v1793 = v1785, mal minus note on omission
1819 cald1
cald1: (Cym. //)
2455+1 motion . . . sence] Caldecott (ed. 1819): “Motion is simply the faculty of moving. Sense is sensation, feeling, apprehension; much as it is used just above, ‘That it be proof and bulwark against sense,’ where it means ‘all feeling.’ Or, as in Cym. [1.1.117 (138-9)]. ‘Remain thou here (putting on a ring) While sense can keep it on,’ Posthum.”
1832 cald2
cald2 = cald1 + Heywood analogue
2455+1 motion . . .
sence]
Caldecott (ed. 1832): “‘He must be a thing living, such as we, Cal’d animal; if live, he must have
sense.’ Heywood’s
Hierarchie of Angels, p. 27. ‘If limbs and organs, consequently then They must have sense; if
sense, passions as men And therefore capable,’ &c.
Ib. 1630, p. 212.”
1854 del2
del2
2455+1-2455+2 sence Is appoplext] Delius (ed. 1854): “sense ist der Complex aller Sinne, der bei der Königin gelähmt, wie vom Schlage betroffen ist (apoplex’d), aber doch noch bei ihr sinnliche Regungen (motion) zu erzeugen im Stande ist.” [sense is the complex of all senses which in the queen has been lamed as if by an apoplectic stroke, but is still able to furnish her with movement (motion).]
1864a glo
glo: Err., Oth., TGV , Tmp. //s
2455+1 motion] Clark and Wright (ed. 1864a [1865] 9: glossary, Motion): “SB. solicitation. Err. [1.1.59 (63)]. Emotion. Oth. [1.2.75 (293)]; SB. a puppet. TGV [2.1.94 (487)].”
1866 ktlyn
ktlyn
2455+1 motion] Keightley (ed. 1866, glossary): “motion] puppet, puppet shows were called motions.”
1875 Nicholson
Nicholson
2455+1 motion]
Nicholson (1875, p.450): “Hence, these things follow: —First, that the existence of ‘motion’ proved or predicated the presence of the soul sensible, and therefore, of the outer and inner wit. Secondly, that ‘motion’ included, or might include (muscular movement) the motion of the blood and other humors, and the motion of the spirits or movements of the thoughts and desires pertaining to the animal soul. And various other passages in Sh. cannot be properly understood unless these things be borne in mind. Thirdly, that the strength and sting of
Hamlet’s reproof lie in this—if you have not rational judgement, if you have not the rational soul, yet ‘motion’ shows you have the soul sensible of the brutes, and, therefore, feeling of what is good and what is noxious (as explained in the first quotations from ch. 6) though sure the senses are apoplex’d. In agreement with this he goes on to of the outer wit senses as apparently acting imperfectly.”
1875 Greenwood
Greenwood: warb, stau; Aristotle
2455+1 Els . . .
motion]
Greenwood (
The Athenaeum, no. 2470, February 1875, p. 302.): “One of the old commentators (Warburton, I think) would emend this passage thus, ‘Sense, sure you have, else, could you not have
notion’; and he interprets it as having reference to the proposition erroneously ascribed to Aristotle, ‘Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu.’ Staunton adopting the old (and doubtless correct) reading, explains thus, ‘Sense (i.e., the sensibility to appreciate the distinction between external objects) you must have, or you would no longer feel the impulse of desire.’ And in the same way he would explain
Oth. [1.3.94-96 (435-37)] “A maiden never bold; of spirit so still and quiet that her motion blushed at herself.’ I cannot help thinking that Sh. must have got hold of some of the doctrines of the Aristotelian Psychology, and that they were running in his mind at the time when he wrote the above quoted lines from ‘
Hamlet’, which although not in the folio, are found in quarto (B). Now in the ‘De anima’, Bk. ii ch. 3, Aristotle tells us that the faculties of the soul (which is here co-extensive with the vital principle) are growth, desire, sense, motion, and reason. Plants have only the principle of growth; animals have sense as well, which, as he tells us in the ch.2, is the distinguishing faculty of the animal soul. ‘For of those things which do not move nor change their place, but yet have sense, we say that they are animals, not only that they have life.’ Then comes motion; so that motion implies sense and an animal that has motion must necessarily have sense as well. It may be observed that this does not entirely militate against Staunton’s explanation, but rather throws new light upon the connexion of the ideas of motion and desire. Aristotle himself tells us, in ch. 3, that if an animal have sense it has also desire, and in Bk. iii. ch 10, where he sketches the yet undeveloped theory of the moral syllogism, he tells us that that which is moved and at the same time moves us in all moral action, is the principle of desire.”
1875 Nicholson
Nicholson: contra Greenwood
2455-2455+1 Nicholson, B. (
The Athenæum, 2501, Oct. 2, 1875, pp. 450): “First, . . . the existence of ‘motion’ proved or predicated the presence of the soul sensible, and, therefore, of the outer and inner wit. Secondly, . . . ‘motion’ included, or might include (muscular movement) the motion of the blood and other humours, and the motion of the spirits or movements of the thoughts and desires pertaining to the animal soul. And various other passages in Sh. cannot be properly understood unless these things be borne in mind. Thirdly, . . . the strength and sting of
Hamlet’s reproof lie in this—if you have not rational judgment, if you have not the rational soul, yet ‘motion’ shows you have the soul sensible of the brutes, and, therefore, feeling of what is good and what is noxious . . . though sure the senses are apoplex’d.”
Nicholson is working from Batman’s translation of Bartholomew (especially Book 3, chapters 6, 7, 9, 11, and 12), based on Douce’s suggestion. Here he illustrates how Sh. can be better understood by reference to “the Aristotelian and early Christian philosophy as set forth in Sh’s time,” rather than to Aristotle’s De Anima, as Greenwood had argued.
1888 Savage
mPudsey
2455+1-2455+2 but . . . appoplext] Pudsey (apud Savage, 1888, p. 74): “his sence is apoplext.”
Savage’s transcription is said to be from a notebook attributed to Edward Pudsey, which was supposedly compiled by 1616 (the dates on the last two page are 1615 and 1616, respectively).
1889 Barnett
Barnett
2455+1 motion] Barnett (1889, p. 51): “emotion.”
1890 irv2
irv2 = Barnett for motion
1891 dtn
dtn: stau (incl. MM, Oth. //s)
2455+1 motion] Deighton (ed. 1891): “‘impulse of desire’ (Staunton), who compares MM [1.1.51 (59)], ‘The wanton stings and motions of the sense’; Oth. [1.3.95 (436)], ‘Of spirit so still and quiet, that her motion Blush’d at herself’; [1.3.330 (683)], ‘our raging motions, our carnal stings.’”
1934 rid1
rid1 = irv2 for motion
1957 pel1
pel1
2455+1 motion] Farnham (ed. 1957): “desire, impulse.”
1982 ard2
ard2: warb (Aristotle); C.S. Lewis
2455+1 Els . . . motion] Jenkins (ed. 1982): “It was an Aristolelian maxim that the external senses are necessarily present in all creatures which have the power of locomotion (De Sensu, ch. i, 436b). See C. S. Lewis, Studies in Words, p.151. This shows the meaning of both key words here and refutes the usual interpretations of motion as emotion, impulse, or desire.”
1998 OED
OED
2455+1 motion] OED (Sept. 14, 1998): “c. Power of movement, capability of moving (as the property of an animate body). 1603 SHAKS. Meas. for M. III. i. 120 This sensible warme motion, to become A kneaded clod. 1667 MILTON P.L. II. 151 Devoid of sense and motion. 1698 ROKEBY in Misc. (Surtees No. 37) 62, I was taken with a very great indisposition..my motion in a manner wholly lost..I was necessitated to be carryed up staires.”
2006 ard3q2
ard3q2
2455+1 Sense. . . motion] Thompson & Taylor (ed. 2006): “i.e. you must have some basic sense or apprehension or you would not be living and moving.”
2455+1
